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The experimental treatments analysed in this paper are simple in that there is a unique Nash equilibrium resulting in each
player having a dominant strategy. However, the data show quite clearly that subjects do not always choose this strategy.
In fact, when this dominant strategy is not a “focal” outcome it does not even describe the average decision adequately. It
is shown that average individual decisions are best described by a decision error model based on a censored distribution as
opposed to the truncate regression model which is typically used in similar studies. Moreover it is shown that in the treatments
where the dominant strategy is not “focal” dynamics are important with average subject decisions initially corresponding to
the “focal” outcome and then adjusting towards the Nash prediction. Overall, 66.7% of subjects are consistent with Payoﬀ
Maximization, 27.8% are consistent with an alternate preference maximization and 5.6% are random. (JEL C72, C92, D70)
Keywords: Quantal Response, Moral Hazard In Groups, Exogenous Targeting Instruments, Experiments
1. Introduction
In the public good environment, with linear payoﬀ functions, the payoﬀ maximizing dominant strategy
typically is to contribute nothing, but partial contributions are consistently observed. A similar phenomenon
is observed in the negative externality experiment investigated by Spraggon (2002a; 2002b). Subjects are
assigned randomly to a payoﬀ function which results in the dominant strategy Nash prediction either on
the lower bound of the decision space (as in the standard linear public goods experiment) or in the interior
of the decision space. As in the linear public good experiment, those whose Nash decision is to choose
zero choose signiﬁcantly higher numbers on average. However, those whose Nash decision is in the interior
∗ This research is sponsored through a grant from Environment Canada McMaster University’s Eco-Research Program for
the Hamilton Harbour. An earlier draft of this paper was presented to the Economic Science Association. Thanks are due
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of the decision space choose signiﬁcantly lower numbers on average. Typically over contribution in the
public good environment is attributed to altruism (e.g. Willinger and Ziegelmeyer 2001; and Anderson
et al. 1998) as choosing larger numbers makes others better oﬀ. Saijo and Nakamura (1995) reversed the
standard public good experiment so that full contribution is the Nash equilibria. They found that in this
case subjects contributed less than the Nash prediction and attributed this behavior to spite.1 In the
negative externality environment choosing larger numbers makes others worse oﬀ while choosing lower
numbers makes others better oﬀ. As a result we observe some subjects who behave altruistically and some
who behave spitefully, but this behavior depends on their payoﬀ function which was assigned randomly.
Ledyard (1995) suggests that subjects can be classiﬁed into those whose decisions can be explained
by either payoﬀ or alternate preference maximization and decision error and those whose decisions seem
random. This paradigm is applied to the negative externality experiment discussed in Spraggon (2002a;
2002b). This experiment provides a unique opportunity to test whether the various theories suggested in
the literature to explain non-Nash decisions for two reasons. The ﬁrst is that the diﬀerent frame allows
us to test models which have been shown to explain individual decision making in a slightly diﬀerent
environment. The second is that a quadratic payoﬀ function has been used in this experiment, and the
Nash decision has been varied throughout the decision space.
In the standard public good environment it is diﬃcult to identify whether the partial contributions are
due to incompletely controlled preferences or decision error. When the dominant strategy Nash equilibrium
is on a boundary –as it is in the standard linear public good environment– both preference and decision error
hypotheses predict the same behaviour. To discriminate between these two explanations, the parameters
of the experiment must be varied (Palfrey and Prisbrey, 1997). Palfrey and Prisbrey use the simple linear
public good environment and vary the parameters faced by each subject in each period. Anderson et al.
(1998) use the variation of parameters across diﬀerent experiments to identify the eﬀects of the diﬀerent
hypotheses. Both papers ﬁnd that both preference explanations and decision error are important in how
subjects make their decisions. Other authors have complicated the simple public good environment by
introducing payoﬀ functions that are nonlinear, making partial contribution the payoﬀ maximizing dom-
inant strategy (Willinger and Ziegelmeyer, 2001; Laury and Holt, forthcoming; Keser, 1996; Sefton and
1 Brunton et al. (2001) replicate the Saijo and Nakamura (1995) experiment and call into question the spite explanation
by also testing for the subjects value orientations.
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Steinberg, 1996; Chan et al., 1996). This allows diﬀerent eﬀects of errors and preferences to be identiﬁed.
Errors should result in a distribution of decisions that is symmetric about the payoﬀ maximizing dominant
strategy Nash equilibrium (barring any boundary eﬀects) while preferences should result in the peak of
the distribution of subjects’ contributions being diﬀerent from the payoﬀ maximizing decision (Anderson
et al. 1998). These studies suggest that both preferences and decision error are important in how subjects
make their decisions.
This paper diﬀers from the previous literature in that it is framed as a public bad rather than a
public good. Authors such as Park (2001), Willinger and Ziegelmeyer (1999), Sonnemans et al. (1998)
and Andreoni (1995) show that decisions are closer to the dominant strategy Nash equilibrium in public
bad than they are in public good experiments. Second, where previous studies use a truncated version of
the quantal response equilibrium model introduced in McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) and used by authors
such as Oﬀerman, Schram and Sonnemans (1998), Anderson, Goeree, and Holt (1998) and Willinger and
Ziegelmeyer (2001). We introduce a censored version of the quantal response equilibrium model.
In this environment, we ﬁnd that decision making is best described by a simple heuristic in early periods
followed by adjustment towards the dominant strategy Nash equilibrium. Moreover, it is argued that the
censored form of the quantal response equilibrium model is more consistent with the data both theoretically
and empirically. However, at the individual level, decision making is consistent with the proportions of Nash
decision making, alternate preferences and randomness suggested by Ledyard (1995).
Section two of this paper presents the model underlying the experiment and the predictions if subjects
are payoﬀ maximizers. Also, in section two the logit quantal response and Tobit models are presented.
Section three summarizes the predictions of these models of preferences and decision error. Section four
discusses the consistency of the individual level data from the experiments with the predictions of the
preference models and the preference models augmented by the decision error models. Finally, section ﬁve
summarizes and concludes the paper.
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2. The Moral Hazard in Groups Experiment
The experiment is based on a standard moral hazard in groups problem. Subjects choose a decision number,
the larger the number the higher the subject’s private payoﬀ. A principal, who would like to induce the
agents to reduce their decision number, uses a contract so that the higher the sum of the decisions of
everyone in the group the lower the group payoﬀ. This is analogous to Segerson’s (1988) solution to the
non-point source pollution problem as well as the common pool resource problem; the more of the resource
the subject appropriates for herself the higher her proﬁts but the lower the payoﬀ to society. An individual’s
total payoﬀ function is given by the sum of the private payoﬀ function (terms one and two) and the group
payoﬀ function (term three):
πn = 25 − 0.002(xU




where xn is individual n’s decision number, and xU
n is the upper limit on individual n’s decision number.
There are two treatments. In the ﬁrst, all of the subjects are “medium capacity” in that they choose
their decision numbers between 0 and 100 (xU
n = 100). These sessions are referred to as homogeneous. In
the second, half of the subjects are large capacity who choose their decision numbers between 0 and 125
(xU
n = 125) and half are small capacity who choose their decision number between 0 and 75 (xU
n = 75).2 In
the homogeneous treatments subjects were informed that they were all choosing between 0 and 100, while
in the heterogeneous treatments subjects were told that three of the people in their group choose decision
numbers between 0 and 75 and three choose decision numbers between 0 and 125. Moreover, subjects were
given tables representing their own payoﬀ function and in the heterogeneous sessions the payoﬀ function
of someone of the other type.
Each experimental session involved one group of six subjects indexed n = 1...6. Each subject made
twenty-ﬁve decisions for each of two treatments in each session. Subjects had full information as to the
number of people in the group, the payoﬀ functions of the others and the number of periods. The subjects
2 The homogeneous treatments are described in more detail in Spraggon 2002a, and the heterogeneous treatments are
discussed in Spraggon 2002b.
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were also informed that the maximum possible group total was six-hundred.3 This treatment is referred
to as the Tax-Subsidy instrument in Spraggon (2002a; 2002b). This paper uses data from the periods
which were presented to subjects with no previous experience in this environment. Subjects were randomly
assigned a capacity which determined their private payoﬀ for each possible decision number.4
The Nash equilibrium for the stage game is trivial to calculate. A subject’s best response is to choose
a decision number which maximizes the payoﬀ function (1). Notice that this function is separable in






n) − 0.3 = 0 (2)
which results in a dominant strategy for each subject given by x∗
n = xU
n − 75. Thus, the Nash equilibrium
decision numbers are 0, 25 and 50 for small, medium and large capacity subjects, respectively. For both the
homogeneous and heterogeneous treatments, if all subjects choose the Nash equilibrium decision number,
the group total will be equal to the target level of 150. Since this is the unique Nash equilibrium in the
stage game it is also the unique subgame perfect equilibrium in the ﬁnitely repeated game (Osborne and
Rubinstein 1994, pp. 157-158).
2.1. Alternate Preferences
There are many diﬀerent preference explanations for why people deviate from the Nash equilibrium strategy.
Most of these explanations are focused on non-Nash contributions in public good experiments. People could
contribute to a public good (when it is not in their ﬁnancial interest) because they receive a non-monetary
reward simply from contributing or from making others better oﬀ. The former is referred to as “warm-
glow”, the latter is referred to as altruism (Palfrey and Prisbrey, 1997). Other authors such as Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) have suggested that a subjects relative payoﬀ either to
the maximum or minimum payoﬀ in the Fehr and Schmidt paper or to the average payoﬀ in the Bolton
3 The maximum possible decision number is the sum of the maximum possible decision numbers for everyone in the group
(600, 6 × 100 in the homogeneous treatments and 3 × 75 + 3 × 125 in the heterogeneous treatments)
4 When subjects arrived for the experiment they randomly chose a numbered card from a pile. The number determined
their capacity.
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Table I. Predictions of Payoﬀ Maximization and Alternate Preference Explanations
Payoﬀ Altruism Equity in Fehr & Bolton Value Orientations
Treatment Maximization decision Schmidt et al. Cooperators Individualists Competitors
Large Capacity 50 <50 <50 S 50 50 <50 50 >50
Medium Capacity 25 <25 25 S 25 25 <25 25 >25
Small Capacity 0 0 >0 >0 0 0 0 >0
Columns 2 through 9 refer to the diﬀerent preference explanations discussed in the text.
and Ockenfels paper may eﬀect decision making. Moreover, authors such as Hackett, Schlager and Walker
(1994) Chan et al. (1997) and Rapoport and Suleiman (1993) suggest that an individual’s decision may
depend on the decisions made by other subjects. Another attempt to explain how people make decisions
in these types of experiments is the value orientation method investigated by authors such as Oﬀerman et
al. (1996), Park (2001) and Buckley et al. (2002). Each of these models make diﬀerent predictions which
are summarized in Table 1 and discussed below.
If altruism or warm-glow is important, subjects will choose decision numbers which are less than the
payoﬀ maximizing prediction since choosing lower decision numbers increases the group component of the
payoﬀ function (0.3(150−
P6
n=1 xn)). If warm-glow is important then the choice of decision number should
be independent of the number of people it will beneﬁt while if altruism is important then increasing the
number of people who enjoy the public good should lead to higher contributions. Since I do not vary the
number of subjects I cannot identify separate eﬀects of altruism and warm glow. Moreover, Goeree et al.
(2002) suggest that contributions rise with group size which is consistent with altruism rather than warm-
glow. As a result, I ignore warm-glow and concentrate on altruism. In the present environment reducing
one’s decision number from the maximum makes the other people in the group better oﬀ in the same way
as contributing to a public good.
The Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Rapoport and Suleiman (1993), Hackett,
Schlager and Walker (1994), and Chan et al. (1997) papers are all concerned with diﬀerent types of equity.
The ﬁrst two papers use models based on equity in terms of utility while the ﬁnal three papers advocate
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models based on equity in terms of the decision numbers chosen (which corresponds to appropriation
or contribution in these environments). We will refer to the former as equity in payoﬀ and the latter
as equity in decision. The Hackett, Schlager and Walker (1994) paper points out that there are many
diﬀerent ideas of equity which subjects might use to choose their decision numbers in the common pool
resource environment. They might feel that they should all choose the same decision number, or the same
proportion of their maximum decision number, or reduce their decision number from the maximum by
the same amount, or reduce from their maximum decision number by the same proportion. The Rapoport
and Suleiman (1993) and Chan et al. (1997) papers focus on the relationship between the individuals
decision and the average decision of the rest of the subjects in the group. For the homogeneous treatments,
all of these equitable solutions result in the subjects choosing the Nash equilibrium prediction. For the
heterogeneous treatments, the Nash equilibrium prediction of the payoﬀ maximization model is an equal
reduction from the maximum decision number. If subjects choose the same decision number, they would all
choose 25. If they reduce their decision number by the same proportion or choose the same proportion of
their decision number, the small capacity subjects would choose 19 and the large capacity subjects would
choose 31. We refer to all subjects choosing 25 as the ‘focal’ or simple heuristic solution as it can be arrived
at by dividing the target (150) by the number of people in the group. The Fehr and Schmidt and Bolton
and Ockenfels papers are concerned with relative payoﬀs. In both the homogeneous and heterogeneous
treatments the Nash equilibrium results in equal payoﬀs for all subjects. If subjects prefer to have either
the highest or lowest relative payoﬀs they should choose decision numbers which are higher or lower than
the Nash prediction. Thus the Bolton and Ockenfels model predicts that subjects should choose the Nash
equilibria while the Fehr and Schmidt model provides an explanation for why subjects may choose decision
numbers which are higher or lower than the payoﬀ maximizing Nash equilibria.
The value orientation hypothesis used by authors such as Oﬀerman et al. (1996), Park (2001) and
Buckley et al. (2001) show that subjects can be classiﬁed into cooperators, individualists and competitors.
In this experiment cooperators are likely to reduce their decisions below the Nash prediction which makes
everyone in the group better oﬀ, individualists should choose the Nash prediction and competitors should
choose decision numbers in excess of the Nash prediction which makes everyone worse oﬀ.
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2.2. Logit Quantal Response Equilibrium
Authors such as Oﬀerman et al. (1998), Anderson, Goeree, and Holt (1998) and Willinger and Ziegelmeyer
(2001) apply the McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) quantal response equilibrium to public good games. This
theory is based on the assumption that subjects make mistakes or are uncertain with respect to their utility.
Further, subjects are assumed to make their decisions under the belief that others also make mistakes or are
uncertain about their utility from a given strategy. The probability of a strategy being chosen is modeled as
depending on the expected payoﬀ of the strategy. Strategies with higher expected payoﬀs are played with
higher frequencies than strategies with lower expected payoﬀs. The distribution of individual decisions is
modelled as the truncated logistic distribution
fn(xn) = Kexp(πe
n(xn)/µ) (3)
where K is a constant chosen such that the density integrates to one and µ parameterizes the importance
of individual errors. As the decision error parameter (µ) approaches zero, the quantal response equilibrium
approaches the Nash equilibrium prediction of the payoﬀ maximizing model and as µ approaches inﬁnity,
the quantal response model predicts random play.
For the quadratic payoﬀ function discussed in this paper the quantal response model can be written
as:
fn(xn) = K0exp(−0.002(xn − x∗)2/µ) (4)
where x∗, the utility maximizing decision, is the peak of the distribution and K0 is a constant which
depends on the decisions of other subjects. Appendix A.1 provides a detailed derivation of this function.
Anderson et al. (1998) show that for expected payoﬀ functions of this form, there is a unique quantal
response equilibrium and that the expected contribution under this equilibrium is “sandwiched” between
the equilibrium outcome without decision error and half of the endowment. This is a direct result of the
assumption that more costly errors are less likely to be observed. As shown in Figure 1, the peak of the
distribution is at the preference maximizing decision for medium capacity subjects. Figure 1 also shows
the importance of the decision error parameter (µ). Notice that when µ = 1 there is a very deﬁnite peak
and as µ approaches inﬁnity the distribution approaches a uniform distribution. As a result, this model’s
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prediction depends on the decision error parameter as well as the subject’s capacity, and the subject’s
preferences for altruism and equity (which eﬀect x∗, the peak of the distribution).
The assumption that the distribution of individual decisions is truncated is not innocuous. Greene
(2000) describes truncated data as data which is “drawn from a subset of a larger population of interest”
(p. 896) as opposed to censored data where the actual observation may diﬀer from the true observation.
In terms of the experimental data presented here, truncation would best describe the data if the subjects
were selected from a group of people who would never want to choose below zero or above their maximum
decision (xU
n). Alternatively, the data is best described by censoring if subjects who might like to choose
numbers below zero or above their maximum (xU
n) choose zero or their maximum (xU
n) instead.5 Whether
subjects behave as if the only reasonable decisions are between zero and their upper bound (xU
n) or as if
they would rather choose decisions outside of the range is at least partially an empirical question. As a
result, both a truncated and a censored distribution are ﬁt to the data and the results are presented in the
next section.
The censored distribution diﬀers from the truncated distribution in that instead of normalizing all
of the frequencies in the decision space, the density is estimated separately for observations at the lower
bound, observations in the middle of the density, and observations at the upper bound. The distribution
of decisions in this case is given by
gn(xn) =

   
   
Φ(−x∗/
p





µ/2k) if 0 < xn < xU
n
1 − Φ((xmax − x∗)/
p
µ/2k) if xn = xU
n
(5)
where Φ is the cumulative standard normal distribution. More information on the censored distribution is
provided in Appendix A.2.
As suggested in the previous section if subjects have preferences diﬀering from simple payoﬀ maximiza-
tion then x∗
n will diﬀer from the prediction of payoﬀ maximization. Indeed the peak of the distribution
5 Choosing above or below the boundary is not necessarily irrational. Consider a subject with either extreme altruism or a
strong preference for the group total to equal the target (150). They may receive utility from choosing decision numbers below
zero, even though this may result in negative payoﬀs. A similar argument can be made for those who might like to choose
numbers greater than the boundary.
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of individual decisions should be the utility maximizing decision number. Since subjects were randomly
assigned to a role there is no reason to believe that preferences should not be consistent across the
treatments. As a result, the estimation of the peaks of the quantal response model will suggest which
types of preferences are most consistent with the data.
3. Results
3.1. Average decisions are best described by the censored form of the Quantal
Response Model and equity in decision.
The parameters of the decision error model (the preference maximizing decision (x∗) and error parameter
(µ)) can be estimated by maximum likelihood for both the truncated and censored distributions. Table II
shows the estimated parameters, mean of the estimated distribution, and the mean log-likelihood for each
subject type and for the truncated and censored models.
For the large capacity subjects, the truncated model has a large error parameter (µ = 4.3) and the
estimated peak (x∗ = 20.95) is low. The censored distribution has a much lower error parameter (µ = 2.35)
and the estimated peak (x∗ = 35.18) is closer to the mean decision number (35.29). The means of both
of these estimated distributions are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the observed mean. Figure 2 shows the
distributions for large capacity subjects. Notice that the peak of the censored distribution is more consistent
with the data as the peak of the truncated distribution is low so as to ﬁt the observations around zero.
For the small capacity subjects, the truncated model is only able to converge if the estimated peak
is constrained at zero, however both parameters are able to be estimated from the censored distribution.
Figure 3 shows that the censored distribution is able to account for both of the spikes at the end points as
well as the peak in the middle of the decision space. This again suggests that the data are more consistent
with the censoring hypothesis and that the truncated distribution is biased.
Finally, notice that for the medium capacity subjects both the truncated and the censored distributions
have similar estimations for the error parameter (µ) and the peak of the distribution (x∗). The error
parameter is slightly smaller for the censored distribution and the estimated peak is closer to the observed
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Table II. Predictions from Estimations with Decision Error Model
Treatment Estimated Estimated Mean Fitted Mean Log-
µ x
∗ Distribution likelihood
Large Capacity, Observed Mean: 35.293
Truncated 4.3010 20.9528 35.3 -3.53967
(0.8884) (5.5683) (225 obs)
Censored 2.3468 35.1784 35.97 -4.50947
(0.1795) (1.4508) (225 obs)
Medium Capacity, Observed Mean: 26.407
Truncated 1.0688 24.0232 26.41 -4.03231
(0.1029) (1.0167) (450 obs)
Censored 0.8679 26.2678 26.49 -4.02168
(0.0547) (0.6990) (450 obs)
Small Capacity, Observed Mean: 21.529
Truncated 4.1492 0 24.54 -4.11492
(0.5104) (0) (225 obs)
Censored 2.4907 18.9855 22.04 -3.94358
(0.2725) (1.7105) (225 obs)
* the numbers in parenthesis are standard errors.
mean. Notice in Figure 4 that as was the case for the large and small capacity the truncated distribution
is higher than the censored for low decision numbers, an eﬀect which is picked up only at the end point
for the censored model. This also suggests that the censored model better describes the data.
The estimation of the censored quantal response model suggests that the preference maximizing decision
number for small capacity subjects is statistically signiﬁcantly greater than the payoﬀ maximizing Nash
prediction, equal to the payoﬀ maximizing Nash prediction for the medium capacity subjects and statisti-
cally signiﬁcantly less than the payoﬀ maximizing Nash prediction for the large capacity subjects. Table I
shows that these results are only consistent with equity in decision. The results do not seem consistent with
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the other models in that these models predictions are not consistent across the diﬀerent treatment groups
(see Table 1). Since subjects are assigned to the treatment group randomly there is no reason to believe
that more altruistic individuals were assigned to the role of large capacity subjects than were assigned to
the role of small capacity subjects. Moreover, we would need an almost perfect mix of altruistic/negative
altruistic subjects to obtain the results we see for the medium capacity subjects. This same argument can
be made for the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Value Orientations hypotheses. Equity in decision is the
only model which predicts that some groups will choose numbers greater, some will choose less and some
will choose numbers that are equal to the Nash prediction.
3.2. Dynamics are important: subject’s initial decisions correspond to a simple heuristic
and adjust toward the Nash prediction over time
The basic result is shown in Table III and Figures 5 through 7. For large and small capacity subjects their
decision numbers are initially very close to 25 and then adjust towards the Nash prediction (50 and 0) over
time. The mean decision number for medium capacity subjects is consistently close to 25 across all periods.
This suggests that on average subjects make their initial decision using the simple heuristic (the target
divided by the number of people in the group), and then the incentives induce the large capacity subjects
to increase their decision numbers and the small capacity subjects to reduce their decision numbers. Notice
that the large capacity subjects converge more closely to the Nash prediction than do the small capacity
subjects.
Table IV presents the results of the convergence regression suggested by Noussair et al. (1995). Notice
that individual decisions are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 25 for any of the subject types in the early
periods and that only the time trend for the large capacity subjects is statistically signiﬁcant.6 The
regression analysis was conducted using both White’s (1980) correction method and a random eﬀects
model (Green 2000) to account for the interdependence of the observations. Recall that for both subject
types increasing your decision numbers increases your private payoﬀ and decreases your group payoﬀ while
decreasing your decision numbers decreases private payoﬀ and increases your group payoﬀ. Thus, the small
capacity subjects reducing their decision numbers by less than the large capacity increase their decision
6 A simple Tobit regression with dummy variables for the three diﬀerent subject capacities and this dummy crossed with
period also provides the same results.
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Table III. Mean and Median Decision Numbers by Capacity
Mean Median
Treatment Period 1 All Periods Period 25 Period 1 All Periods Period 25
20.44 35.29 51.89 25 30 50
Large Type (3.99) (1.57) (10.22) (3.99) (1.57) (10.22)
[9] [225] [9] [9] [225] [9]
26.72 26.41 32.89 25 25 25.5
Medium Type (4.88) (0.674) (4.82) (4.88) (0.674) (4.82)
[18] [450] [18] [18] [450] [18]
24.89 21.53 19.56 15 20 5
Small Type (8.69) (1.41) (9.06) (8.69) (1.41) (9.06)
[9] [225] [9] [9] [225] [9]
* the numbers in parenthesis are standard errors and the number in square brackets is the
number of observations.
Table IV. Random Eﬀects Tobit Regression of Convergence Model for Individual
Decisions
Number of Observations = 900 Log Likelihood = -3755.43
Coeﬃcient Std. Error z P > |z|
Large/t β11 15.22 5.70 2.67 0.008
Small/t β12 27.24 5.774 4.72 0.000
Medium/t β13 26.96 4.06 6.64 0.000
Large(t-1)/t β21 38.81 1.73 22.47 0.000
Small(t-1)/t β22 18.31 1.759 10.40 0.000
Medium(t-1)/t β23 26.05 1.273 20.47 0.000
xn = β11L/t + β12S/t + β13M/t + β21L(t − 1)/t + β22S(t − 1)/t + β23M(t − 1)/t + ,
standard errors adjusted for clustering on session. Where L represents large capacity
subjects, S represents small capacity subjects,M represents medium capacity
subjects, and t represents period.
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number is consistent with the hypothesis that subjects receive more dis-utility from having a payoﬀ below
the average than they do from having a payoﬀ which is above average (Fehr and Schmidt (1999); Kahneman
and Tversky (1979)).
3.3. There is considerable Heterogeneity in Individual Decisions
The preceding analysis is concerned primarily with individual decision making on average. As Ledyard
(1995) suggests, decisions diﬀer by individual. Figures 8 through 10 describe the individual decisions for
each subject by capacity.7 These ﬁgures show a great deal of heterogeneity between individuals.
Figure 8 describes the individual decisions of the large capacity subjects. Notice that only one of the
subjects’ (52) choices are close to the Nash prediction for a signiﬁcant number of periods. Subjects 42, 53,
63 and possibly 61 seem to adjust to the Nash prediction by the ﬁnal period. Subjects 51 and 62 consistently
chose 25 or close, while subject 41 chose close to zero and eventually increased their decision to just under
20. Subject 43’s average decision is 41.68 and the decisions ranged from zero to 50 in a pattern that seems
random. Hence Nash or convergence to Nash is a good predictor for 5 of the 9 subjects while equity in
decision or extreme altruism seems to explain the decisions of 3 of the 9 and the ﬁnal subject appears to
have been choosing randomly. Moreover, the decisions of subjects 42, 52, 53, 61, and 63 (5 of 9) start close
to the simple heuristic (25) and converge toward Nash.
For the small capacity subjects (Figure 9) one chose the Nash decision every time (46), one is very close
in all periods (64), one chose Nash in most periods (54) and one converges towards it (65). One subject
initially chose the Nash prediction and then converges above 25 (44); Subjects 55, 56 and 66 choices are
close to 25 in most periods while subject 45 chose close to her maximum and then falls but not quite to the
Nash level over time. Thus we have four subjects whose decisions are best described by the Nash prediction
and ﬁve whose decisions are consistent with some other preference explanation. Four of the nine start at
25 and then converge to the Nash prediction.
For the medium capacity subjects 15 of 18 (subjects 11, 12, 13, 16, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 31, 32, 33,
34 and 36) chose decisions that are quite close to the Nash prediction. Subjects 14 and 35 converged away
7 Fischbacher et al. (2001) use similar ﬁgures, except they solicit reaction curves as opposed to the ﬁgures here which are
actual decisions.
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from the Nash prediction and subject 15’s decisions were quite random. Thus ﬁfteen of eighteen conformed
to the Nash prediction, two chose according to some other preference and one was random.
Thus, overall we have twenty-four of thirty-six (66.7 percent) subjects whose decisions are best described
by the Nash prediction, ten of thirty-six (27.8 percent) who are consistent with some other preference
explanation and two of the thirty-six (5.6 percent) whose decisions seem random. This is consistent with
Ledyard’s (1995) 50 percent, 40 percent, 10 percent observation across “many subject pools” (p. 173)
and the comparisons between public good and public bad (Andreoni, 1995; Sonnemans et al., 1998; Park,
2001; Willinger and Ziegelmeyer, 1999) which suggest that dominant strategy play is more frequently
observed in public bad environments. Moreover, 9 of 18 (50 percent) of the subjects whose Nash decision
was not the simple heuristic (25) (large and small capacity subjects) start with this rule and then adjust
towards Nash over time. This suggests that payoﬀ-maximizing Nash behavior is a far better predictor of
individual decision making than the earlier analysis indicates.
4. Conclusions
This paper has attempted to provide some explanation for the anomalous decision making observed in
the negative externality experiments presented in Spraggon (2002a and 2002b). This behavior diﬀers from
that observed in the standard public good framework in that subjects with one payoﬀ function choose
decision numbers that are less than the Nash prediction while subjects with another payoﬀ function choose
decision numbers that are greater than the Nash prediction. Despite the diﬀerences in the two environments
individuals behavior is remarkably consistent with the proportions of payoﬀ maximizers, other preference
maximizers and those whose decisions are random suggested by Ledyard (1995). However the deviations are
more consistent with equity in decision than altruism which is the predominant explanation for anomalous
behavior in public good games. Moreover, it is shown that the data is more consistent with a censored
form of the quantal response equilibrium model than the truncated version which is becoming standard in
the literature.
Clearly, this paper suggests that the censored form of the quantal response equilibrium model should be
applied to the data analysis of other experiments. Indeed, in the distributions of individual decision making
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presented by Willinger and Ziegelmeyer (2001) for their public good experiment (Figure 1, p. 137) there are
obvious peaks at the upper bound of the decision space for all of their treatments. That the data presented
here is consistent with equity in decision does not seem as transferable to the public good case. In this
experiment the subjects are told that there is a target and so taking that target and dividing by the number
of people in the group is an obvious and simple way to choose a decision number. This is not the case in
the standard linear public good. Although, in games where there is an obvious and simple way to choose
a decision number, we should expect subjects to make this decision initially and then adjust towards the
Nash equilibrium subject to the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model which suggests that subjects prefer their
payoﬀ to exceed the average payoﬀ of their reference group. Finally, it may be interesting to investigate
how consistent Ledyard’s ballpark classiﬁcation of subjects as Nash payoﬀ maximizers, alternative payoﬀ
maximizers, and those who play randomly is across diﬀerent subject pools and experiments.
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Appendix
A. Mathematical Appendix - The Decision Error Model
A.1. The Truncated Model
The quantal response decision error model assumes that decisions are distributed logistically. This results








(Anderson, Goeree, and Holt, 1998). This is a truncated logistic distribution. For the Tax-Subsidy contract
πe
n is given by equation (1) and as a result the quantal response equilibrium distribution is given by
fn(xn) =
exp[25 − 0.002(xU
n − xn)2 + 0.3(150 − X)]/µ
R zn
0 exp[(25 − 0.002(xU
n − xn)2 + 0.3(150 − X))/µ]∂xn
. (7)




n − xn)2 + 0.3(150 − X))
= 25 − 0.002((xU
n)2 − 2xnxU
n + x2





n − 0.3)xn − 0.002x2
n + C
(the constant will be eliminated)
= 0.002[2(xU
n − 0.3/0.004)xn − x2
n + C0]
(completing the square)
= −0.002[(xn − (xU
n − 0.3/0.004))2 − (xU
n − 0.3/0.004)2 + C0]
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= −0.002(xn − (xU
n − 0.3/0.004))2 + C00. (8)
Notice from the ﬁrst order condition of the individuals payoﬀ function (2) xU






0 exp(−0.002(xn − x∗
n)2)/µ)∂xn
. (9)








exp(−1/2(x − ¯ x)/σ2)∂x = Φ(
A − ¯ x
σ
). (10)



















































taking the ln of this (for the log likelihood)
















A.2. The Censored Model
For the censored assume that ζn is the subjects actual decision and xn is the observed decision which is




   
   
0 if ζn ≤ 0
ζn if 0 < ζn < xU
n
xU
n if ζn ≥ xU
n
(13)
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Assume that ζn has the logistic distribution assumed for the quantal response model. Then
gn(xn) =

   
   
Prob(ζn ≤ 0) if xn = 0
Prob(0 < ζn < xU
n) if 0 < xn < xU
n
Prob(ζn ≥ xU
n) if xn = xU
n
(14)

































































This is the standard Tobit model ((StataCorp, 1999) Reference A-F p. 146, ¯ x = x∗ and σ =
p
µ/2(0.002)).
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Figure 1: Predicted Distributions from the Truncated Logit Quantal Response Model for 























Figure 2: Distribution of Individual Decisions and the Predictions of the Truncated and 
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Figure 3: Distribution of Individual Decisions and the Predictions of the Truncated and 























Figure 4: Distribution of Individual Decisions and the Predictions of the Truncated and 
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